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Abstract—In conventional wireless networks, security issues
are primarily considered above the physical layer and are
usually based on bit-level algorithms to establish the identity
of a legitimate wireless device. Physical layer security is a new
paradigm in which features extracted from an analog signal
can be used to establish the unique identity of a transmitter.
Our previous research work into RF fingerprinting has shown
that every transmitter has a unique RF fingerprint owing to
imperfections in the analog components present in the RF front
end. Generally, it is believed that the RF fingerprint of a specific
transmitter is same across all receivers. That is, a fingerprint
created in one receiver can be transported to another receiver
to establish the identity of a transmitter. However, to the best
of the author’s knowledge, no such example is available in the
literature in which an RF fingerprint generated in one receiver
is used for identification in other receivers. This paper presents
the results of experiments, and analyzing the feasibility of using
an universal RF fingerprint of a transmitter for identification
across different receivers.
Index Terms—Physical Layer Security, Radio Fingerprinting,
USRP
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued proliferation of inexpensive wireless Radio
Frequency (RF) devices provides worldwide communication
connectivity to virtually every individual. These wireless de-
vices broadcast information to intended recipients in the form
of an electromagnetic emission. Due to broadcast nature of
wireless communication, the unintended recipient may simply
listen to the communication activity and remain passive – an
activity that is difficult to detect – or may become active and
compromise the identity of the wireless device by launching
“spoofing” or “man in the middle” type attacks [1]. Much
of the current research is focused on traditional bit-level
algorithmic approaches to improving network security and
mitigating spoofing attacks. However, the security algorithm
would be compromised upon access to the key, thus making
it difficult to distinguish between a legitimate and a cloned
key/device [2]. For example, the Medium Access Control
(MAC) address of a network interface card can be changed
in software [3]. The Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and
Mobile Identification Number (MIN) of a cellular phone can
be changed by replacing the Erasable Programmable Read
Only Memory (EPROM), hence allowing a modification of its
identity [4]. Additionally, higher-layer security key distribution
and management may be difficult to implement and may be
vulnerable to attacks in some environments, such as ad hoc or
relay networks, in which transceivers may join or leave ran-
domly [5, 6]. Furthermore, some recent wireless technologies
do not allow an interactive communication for establishing
a cryptography key owing to their unique architecture. One
such example is a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN), which
was invented in order to increase the efficiency of spectrum
usage. If a Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack is launched
then the whole operation of CRN is jeopardized by effectively
limiting the access of legitimate users to idle spectrum [7].
Thus the compromised identity of wireless devices creates
vulnerability to a variety of attacks, which can take the form
of impersonation, intrusion, theft of bandwidth and denial of
service.
More recently, consideration has been given to detecting
and mitigating spoofing near or at the bottom of the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) network stack. One such work
includes the addition of a “lightweight security layer” hosted
within the MAC layer to detect spoofing and anomalous traffic
[8]. Other recent efforts have focused on Physical (PHY) layer
implementations with the goal of exploiting RF characteristics
(radio and environmental) that are difficult to mimic, thus
minimizing opportunities for spoofing. Hence, identity theft
can be effectively tackled using physical layer security.
Physical layer security is a new concept for securing the
identity of wireless devices by extracting the unique fea-
tures embedded in the electromagnetic waves emitted by
the transmitters [9, 10]. These unique features arises due to
the modulation errors from the modulator, phase noise from
oscillators, spurious tones from mixers and Power Amplifiers
(PA), non-linearity distortion from PAs, power ramp distor-
tions (which are associated with the transients), and distortion
of the equivalent filter in the path from the digital module
to the antenna (including the analog Intermediate Frequency
(IF) filters and RF filters) and from various analog compo-
nents in the transmission chain [11]. Physical layer security
that is based on recognizing these unique features is known
as Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting [12]. The results
published in our previous research work have shown that
similar transmitters (same manufacturer and model) can have
different RF fingerprint, which helps in identification [13–15].
This paper further investigates into the portability of an RF
fingerprint across different receivers. The portability of an RF
fingerprint can have different applications such as enabling
regulatory authorities to identify a wireless intruder/interferer
in a network and enable policing of the wireless spectrum
Figure 1: RF fingerprinting evaluation in ad hoc and infrastructure wireless networks
through identification of illegal wireless transmitters.
The main contribution of this paper is an investigation into
the portability of an RF fingerprint across different receivers
in two scenarios, namely (1) infrastructure and (2) ad hoc
wireless network, as shown in Figure 1. In the infrastructure
scenario, a high-end receiver was used for generating profile
RF fingerprints of transmitters whereas in the ad hoc scenario,
profile RF fingerprints were generated using low-end receivers.
These profile RF fingerprints were used for identification in the
low-end receivers. In this paper, “high-end receiver” means a
receiver front-end built with high quality analog components,
which can cost up to thousands of dollars. A “low-end
receiver” means a receiver front-end built with inexpensive
analog components, which might cost no more than a few
hundred dollars.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the experimental setup, including preamble/ feature
extraction and data collection. Section III explains the classi-
fication process used in this paper. Section IV discusses per-
formance evaluations for infrastructure and Ad hoc scenarios.
Section V concludes the paper with a summary and identifies
avenues for future research.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Figure 2 shows the overall experimental setup that was used
for collecting the data from different transmitters and receivers.
The red and blue dashed boundaries show the processes that
were implemented in hardware and in software, respectively.
An IEEE 802.11a/g standard preamble signal was generated
in MATLAB and transmitted from the seven different USRP
transmitters. The preamble signal was then captured with eight
different receivers. The complex In-phase (I) and Quadrature
(Q) signal components from different receivers were stored
in a computer. The preambles were extracted from the I
and Q components of the signals. The RF fingerprinting
was analysed for varying Signal to Noise Ratios (SNR) that
exists in a typical operational environment. The SNR was
analysed by adding a power-scaled, random, complex Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to the preamble signal. The
Power Spectral Density (PSD) coefficients were extracted from
the noisy preamble signals to form the RF fingerprint for
each transmitter; classification was then performed using a
classifier. The details of the hardwares, experimental setup,
preamble extraction and RF fingerprints formation can be
found in our previous published works [14–17]. Data collec-
tion and classification process is explained in next subsection.
A. Data collection
Each 802.11a/g RF burst starts with a preamble signal . The
preamble signal is made up of a fixed training sequence, which
is used for timing/ frequency acquisition, diversity selection
and channel estimation. The IEEE 802.11a/g preamble signal
is 16 microseconds long and consists of 10 short and 2 long
training sequences [18]. Seven SBX daughter boards are used
as low-end transmitter and receiver as explained in [15]. A
total of 10,000 signals from each transmitter were captured
and stored at each of the receivers, giving a total data set of
490,000 received signals.
III. CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
The RF fingerprinting process consists of two phases:
namely training and testing. In the training phase, a specific
transmitter’s signals were used to create the profile RF fin-
gerprint for that transmitter. Whereas in the testing phase, an
RF fingerprint was created from an input test signal. Then a
trained classifier was used to classify this test RF fingerprint
against the existing profiles of the transmitter. The RF fin-
gerprinting computational complexity is largely dependent on
the RF feature extraction technique. Our technique involves
two steps in creating the RF fingerprint from a received
signal: a) extracting the signal of interest (i.e., preamble); b)
creating the RF fingerprint from PSD coefficients. The PSD
coefficients are calculated using the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT), which is computationally inexpensive and can be im-
plemented using today’s low power DSP chips [19, 20]. Once
an RF fingerprint is created then the rest of computational
complexity is dependent on the classifier. A commonly used
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network was used for
identification in this research work [21, 22], although other
simpler classifiers like K-Nearest Neigbor (KNN) can be used,
Figure 2: Overall RF fingerprinting analysis process for preamble signal generation, transmission/reception, SNR analysis, RF
fingerprint creation and classification.
which we have demonstrated in our previous work [14, 15]. In
both the scenarios, the K-fold cross validation technique was
used for assessing the overall performance.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Figure 1 shows an infrastructure wireless network, in which
all of the wireless devices report to the central node in order
to establish a communication link. A cellular phone network
is a typical example, in which a central base station dissem-
inates information to the cellular phones. The central node
is assumed to be a highly specialized node with a high-end
receiver front end. The central node performs training in order
to create a profile fingerprint of each the transmitter. Then
these profiles are distributed to the low-end wireless devices
through a secure channel. The following is the rationale for
creating a profile RF fingerprint in a high-end receiver
• First, the front-end of low-end devices are built with
imperfect analog components, which are unable to create
unique profile RF fingerprints of transmitters. Therefore,
the burden of creating the profile RF fingerprint is left
to the central node, which is equipped with a specialized
receiver.
• Second, the central node keeps a record of the profile
RF fingerprints of all the transmitters with whom it has
communicated. If a wireless node behaves suspiciously
Table II: Confusion matrix for a system trained with high-
end receivers signals. The confusion matrix is obtained
for signals collected at 15 dB SNR. The confusion matrix
shows predictions in percentage.
(a) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 7
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0.1 0 0.1 0 99.7 0
Tx2 0 0 2.5 0.3 96.8 0.1
Tx3 0 0.2 0.1 0 99.6 0
Tx4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 99.2 0
Tx5 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 98 0.4
Tx6 0 0.1 0.3 0 99.3 0.1
or an interfering node appears in the network then the
central node can disseminate the profile RF fingerprints
of the problematic node to the other low-end devices,
which can then take action to thwart the effects of the
problem node.
Figure 1 shows an ad hoc wireless network in which all
of the wireless nodes have the same specifications. An ad
hoc wireless network is formed without the presence of a
Table I: Confusion matrix for a system trained with high-end receivers signals. The confusion matrix is obtained for
signals collected at 15 dB SNR. The confusion matrix shows predictions in percentage.
(a) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 1
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx2 0.2 0 5.8 0.1 0.2 93.3
Tx3 1 0 2.8 0.1 0.2 95.6
Tx4 0.3 0 0.4 0.2 0.2 98.6
Tx5 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 98.9
Tx6 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.8
Tx7 0 0 0 0 0 99.8
(b) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 2
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 1.5 0 98.4
Tx3 0 0 0.1 2.3 0 97.3
Tx4 0 0 0.19 1.7 0 97.9
Tx5 0 0 0 1.7 0 98.2
Tx6 0 0 0.1 1.4 0.1 98.2
Tx7 0 0 0 0.8 0.1 98.9
(c) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 3
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0.7 0 99.2
Tx2 0 0 0.1 0.7 0 99
Tx4 0 0.1 0.1 1 0 98.6
Tx5 0 0 0 0.6 0 99.2
Tx6 0 0.3 0.2 1.8 0.1 97.3
Tx7 0 0.1 0 0.9 0 98.8
(d) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 4
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx2 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx3 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx5 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx6 0 0 0 0.1 0 99.8
Tx7 0 0 0 0.9 0 98.9
(e) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 5
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx2 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx3 0 0 0 0 0.2 99.6
Tx4 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.7
Tx6 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx7 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.8
(f) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 6
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx2 0 0 0 0.1 0 99.8
Tx3 0.1 0.1 0 0.4 0.7 98.3
Tx4 0.2 0.3 0 0.5 0.3 98.3
Tx5 0 0.4 0 0.7 0.7 98
Tx7 0 0 0 0 0 99.8
central node. In an ad hoc network, it is assumed that all
the wireless devices are equipped with a front end built
with inexpensive analog components. Every low-end receiver
implements training and creates a profile RF fingerprint of the
wireless devices in the ad hoc wireless network because there
is no specialized centralized node. Once a profile is created,
it is tested by matching the RF fingerprint of a received
signal against the already stored profiles. If a match is found
then a wireless device is considered to be a legal transmitter;
otherwise it is considered to be an attacker.
In both scenarios, the profile RF fingerprint of wireless
devices can be created during the initialization phase of a
wireless network such as LTE, IEEE 802.16 [23], IEEE 802.11
[18] and IEEE 802.22 [24]. The initialization phase involves
registration, key exchange and synchronization of wireless
devices [24–26]. This sequence of requests and responses
provides an opportunity to create the profile RF fingerprint
of legitimate wireless devices. Later on, if an impersonation
attack is launched, then the attacker’s RF fingerprints are
checked against the existing RF fingerprint profiles of users
stored in the low-end devices. If a match is not found then it
would be identified as being an impersonation attack.
A. Scenario 1: - Infrastructure Wireless Radio Network
In this scenario, the high-end receiver acts as a specialized
central radio node and the profile RF fingerprints of the seven
transmitters are created with the preamble signals collected
by the high-end receiver. Signals captured from all seven
transmitters by the low-end receivers are used for testing the
effectiveness of the fingerprinting scheme.
Tables 1 and 2 show the confusion matrix at 15 dB SNR
for seven low-end receivers. Table 1 shows that each low-end
receiver (from 1 to 6) incorrectly identifies all transmitters as
Tx7. Low-end receiver Rx7 incorrectly identifies all transmit-
ters as Tx5. In other words, the low-end receivers cannot rely
on the profile fingerprints recorded by the high-end receiver
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(a) Tx1 fingerprint features across receivers
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(b) Tx2 fingerprint features across receivers
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(c) Tx3 fingerprint features across receivers
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(d) Tx4 fingerprint features across receivers
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(e) Tx5 fingerprint features across receivers
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(f) Tx6 fingerprint features across receivers
Mean of PSDVariance of PSD
Osc
Rx1
Rx2
Rx3
Rx4
Rx5
Rx7
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
4
4.5
5
5.5
S
k
e
w
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
P
S
D
(g) Tx7 fingerprint features across receivers
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Figure 3: Receivers create different RF fingerprints for the same set of transmitters at 15dB SNR. In the feature space, the RF
fingerprint created by the high-end receiver is far away from the fingerprint created by the low-end receivers. Note that the
USRP daughterboards have different chains for transmission and reception [27]. In order to avoid any commonalities between
the transmit and receive chains, either the transmit chain or the receive chain of a daughterboard was used; both were not used
at the same time (e.g. when Rx1 was used for capturing the transmitter signals, Tx1 was not captured as it was implemented
on the same daughterboard).
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Figure 4: Profile RF fingerprint of transmitters are generated with the signals captured by Rx 6 and testing is performed with
signals captured by other receivers.
because the low-end receivers (and their impairments) create
fingerprints different from those of the high-end receiver.
Figure 3 illustrates how different the high-end fingerprint of
a transmitters is from the low-end fingerprints of the same
transmitters. Such differences make accurate classification
unlikely.
The RF fingerprint created with a high-end receiver cannot
be reliably transferred to a low-end receiver without com-
pensating for the imperfections of the receivers. The results
suggest that, because of their imperfections, every receiver
forms a different RF fingerprint for the same transmitter,
so the RF fingerprints generated in a single receiver cannot
be used as a universal RF fingerprint of the transmitter. If
a legitimate transmitter fingerprint created with a high-end
receiver is used for identification in a low-end receiver then
the low-end receiver would be likely to identify the legitimate
transmitter as malicious. This implies that RF fingerprinting
is not a viable option for mitigating impersonation attacks
in an infrastructure wireless network, in which a profile RF
fingerprint is created with a high-end receiver different from
the one being used for testing.
B. Scenario 2: - Ad hoc Wireless Network
In the ad hoc wireless network analysis, the profile RF
fingerprints of seven transmitters were created with signals
captured by low-end receivers and tested also with low-end
receiver signals. In the analysis, simulated Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was added to the collected signals
in order to assess the effect of SNR.
Figure 3 shows that every low-end receiver forms its own
RF fingerprint from the received signal of the same transmitter.
To investigate further that the RF fingerprint of a specific
transmitter varies across all receivers or it is limited to a
specific receiver, we trained our MLP neural network with
the signals captured by one low-end receiver and tested with
the signals captured by the other receivers. For example, the
profile RF fingerprints of Tx2 to Tx7 were created with the
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Figure 5: Profile RF fingerprint of transmitters are generated with the signals captured by Rx7 and testing is performed with
signals captured by other receivers.
signals captured by Rx1, then tested using the signals from
the same transmitters but captured by the other receivers.
The classification accuracy is plotted in Figure 4, which
is for the profile RF fingerprint generated from the receiver
Rx6 signals and tested using the signals captured by all of
the other receivers. The True Acceptance rate for different
transmitters showed that correct identification decreased when
the profile fingerprint generated with a different receiver was
used for identification. This shows that every receiver forms
a different RF fingerprint for the same transmitter irrespective
of the receiver type (high or low-end). This implies that the
RF fingerprint of a transmitter is not portable across receivers.
Figure 5 shows the same trend, where profile RF fingerprints
were generated with receiver Rx7 and tested with signals
captured by other receivers. Similar results were obtained for
all other receivers but only two are presented here due to the
space limitation.
V. SUMMARY
The RF fingerprint of a specific transmitter varies across
the receivers due to its front-end, which makes the portability
of an RF fingerprint difficult. The experimental results show
that the RF fingerprint created with a specific receiver (either a
high-end or a low-end) cannot be used as a universal profile RF
fingerprint of a specific transmitter across different receivers.
If a low-end receiver uses profile fingerprints created using
any other receiver (high or low-end alike), it is likely that the
low-end receiver will misclassify transmitters. Our analysis
has shown that the profile fingerprints are specific to the
transmitter-receiver pair and can be used only by the receiver
that created the original profile.
REFERENCES
[1] U. Meyer and S. Wetzel, “A man-in-the-middle attack
on umts,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on
Wireless security. ACM, 2004, pp. 90–97.
[2] S. Mathur, A. Reznik, C. Ye, R. Mukherjee, A. Rahman,
Y. Shah, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam, “Exploiting the
physical layer for enhanced security [security and privacy
in emerging wireless networks],” Wireless Communica-
tions, IEEE, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 63–70, 2010.
[3] D. Faria and D. Cheriton, “Detecting identity-based at-
tacks in wireless networks using signalprints,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Wireless security.
ACM, 2006, pp. 43–52.
[4] N. Nguyen, G. Zheng, Z. Han, and R. Zheng, “De-
vice fingerprinting to enhance wireless security using
nonparametric bayesian method,” in INFOCOM, 2011
Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1404–1412.
[5] M. Debbah, “Mobile flexible networks: The challenges
ahead,” in Advanced Technologies for Communications,
2008. ATC 2008. International Conference on. IEEE,
2008, pp. 3–7.
[6] B. Kauffmann, F. Baccelli, A. Chaintreau, V. Mhatre,
K. Papagiannaki, and C. Diot, “Measurement-based self
organization of interfering 802.11 wireless access net-
works,” in INFOCOM 2007. 26th IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE. IEEE,
2007, pp. 1451–1459.
[7] R. Chen, J. Park, and J. Reed, “Defense against primary
user emulation attacks in cognitive radio networks,”
Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on,
vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 25–37, 2008.
[8] Q. Li and W. Trappe, “Detecting spoofing and anoma-
lous traffic in wireless networks via forge-resistant re-
lationships,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 793–808, 2007.
[9] O. Ureten and N. Serinken, “Wireless security through
rf fingerprinting,” Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Canadian Journal of, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 27 –33, winter
2007.
[10] J. Toonstra and W. Kinsner, “A radio transmitter fin-
gerprinting system ODO-1,” in Electrical and Computer
Engineering, 1996. Canadian Conference on, vol. 1.
IEEE, 2002, pp. 60–63.
[11] K. Gard, L. Larson, and M. Steer, “The impact of rf
front-end characteristics on the spectral regrowth of com-
munications signals,” Microwave Theory and Techniques,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 2179–2186,
2005.
[12] B. Danev, H. Luecken, S. Capkun, and K. El Defrawy,
“Attacks on physical-layer identification,” in Proc. ACM
Conf on Wireless network security, 2010, pp. 89–98.
[13] S. U. Rehman, K. Sowerby, and C. Coghill, “Rf fin-
gerprint extraction from the energy envelope of an in-
stantaneous transient signal,” in Communications Theory
Workshop (AusCTW), 2012 Australian, 30 2012-feb. 2
2012, pp. 90 –95.
[14] S. Rehman, K. Sowerby, and C. Coghill, “Analysis of re-
ceiver front end on the performance of rf fingerprinting,”
in Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications
(PIMRC), 2012 IEEE 23rd International Symposium on.
IEEE, 2012, pp. 2494–2499.
[15] ——, “Analysis of impersonation attacks on systems
using rf fingerprinting and low-end receivers,” Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 80, no. 3, pp.
591–601, 2014.
[16] ——, “Experimental analysis of channel impairments on
the performance of rf fingerprinting using low-end re-
ceivers,” in 9th Annual wireless virginia summer school.
Virginia Tech, 2013.
[17] S. Rehman, K. Sowerby, C. Coghill, and W. Holmes,
“The analysis of rf fingerprinting for low-end wireless
receivers with application to ieee 802.11 a,” in Mobile
and Wireless Networking (iCOST), 2012 International
Conference on Selected Topics in. IEEE, 2012, pp. 24–
29.
[18] I. C. S. L. M. S. Committee et al., “Ieee 802.11:
Wireless lan medium access control and physical layer
specifications,” 1999.
[19] I. Kennedy, P. Scanlon, and M. Buddhikot, “Passive
steady state rf fingerprinting: a cognitive technique for
scalable deployment of co-channel femto cell underlays,”
in New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks,
2008. DySPAN 2008. 3rd IEEE Symposium on. IEEE,
2008, pp. 1–12.
[20] I. Kennedy, P. Scanlon, F. Mullany, M. Buddhikot,
K. Nolan, and T. Rondeau, “Radio transmitter finger-
printing: A steady state frequency domain approach,” in
Vehicular Technology Conference, 2008. VTC 2008-Fall.
IEEE 68th. IEEE, 2008, pp. 1–5.
[21] B. Widrow and M. Lehr, “30 years of adaptive neural
networks: perceptron, madaline, and backpropagation,”
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 78, no. 9, pp. 1415–1442,
1990.
[22] A. Jain, J. Mao, and K. M. Mohiuddin, “Artificial neural
networks: a tutorial,” Computer, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 31–
44, 1996.
[23] C. Eklund, R. B. Marks, K. L. Stanwood, and S. Wang,
“Ieee standard 802.16: a technical overview of the
wirelessman/sup tm/air interface for broadband wireless
access,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 40, no. 6,
pp. 98–107, 2002.
[24] C. Stevenson, G. Chouinard, Z. Lei, W. Hu, S. Shellham-
mer, and W. Caldwell, “Ieee 802.22: The first cognitive
radio wireless regional area network standard,” Commu-
nications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 130–138,
2009.
[25] R. Shaukat, S. Khan, and A. Ahmed, “Augmented Se-
curity in IEEE 802.22 MAC Layer Protocol,” in Wire-
less Communications, Networking and Mobile Comput-
ing, 2008. WiCOM’08. 4th International Conference on.
IEEE, 2008, pp. 1–4.
[26] K. Bian and J. Park, “Security vulnerabilities in IEEE
802.22,” in Proceedings of the 4th Annual International
Conference on Wireless Internet. ICST (Institute for
Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommu-
nications Engineering), 2008, pp. 1–9.
[27] M. Ettus, “Sbx schematic,” Et-
tus Research, Mountain View, CA,
http://code.ettus.com/redmine/ettus/documents/21,
Aug, 2012.
